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RECENT DECISIONS
attorney taking this type of beneficial interest under the will. In State
v. Horan,25 the court mentions as some of the considerations involved,
the conflict of interests, the incompetence of an attorney-bene-
ficiary to testify because of a transaction with the deceased (sec.
325.16, Stats.), the possible jeopardy of the will if its admission
to probate is contested, the possible harm done to other benefici-
aries and the undermining of the public trust and confidence in
the integrity of the legal profession .... 11
In conclusion, in Wisconsin it appears that an attorney designated
in a will as attorney for the executor takes an enforceable interest by
reason of the designation if the executor's appointment is conditioned
upon retention of the designated attorney. As yet, the precise nature of
this interest has not been fully considered, nor have possible ramifica-
tions such as those discussed above. It would thus seem appropriate for
the Wisconsin Supreme Court to reconsider at the first opportunity
presented whether the attorney-designee should have a right to enforce
his designation; and if so, on what basis.
JOHN P. FOLEY
Evidence: Admissibility of a Doctor's Testimony as to His Pa-
tient's Subjective Symptoms: In Ritter v. Coca Cola Co.,' plaintiff
sued for psychological injuries that occurred when she drank a bottle
of Coca-Cola and discovered portions of a decomposed mouse inside.
Plaintiff retained counsel the next day and then consulted a doctor
concerning any possible physical injuries, but none were found. Upon
continuing emotional distress, she visited a psychiatrist and recounted
to him her symptoms of loss of sleep, fear of mice, and fear of non-
translucent liquids. At the trial, after the psychiatrist had testified in
her favor, plaintiff recovered $2,500 for the injuries incurred.
Defendant appealed the °trial court ruling admitting into evidence
the psychiatrist's testimony as to his patient's subjective symptoms.
Defendant contended that to allow this doctor to testify after plaintiff
retained counsel was in direct contravention of the court's previous
holding in Kath v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry.2 and other subsequent cases.
3
The supreme court affirmed, and expressly overruled the Kath case.
It has long been recognized as a valid exception to the hearsay rule,
that a doctor may testify as to subjective symptoms which are related
to him by his patient. It is asserted that declarations made by a person
to his physician while receiving treatment are trustworthy and should
25 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W. 2d 488 (1961).
26 Id. at page 70, 123 N.W. 2d at 490.
124 Wis. 2d 157, 128 N.W. 2d 439 (1964).
2 121 Wis. 503, 99 N.W. 217 (1904).
3 See Thompson v. Nee, 12 Wis. 2d 326, 107 N.W. 2d 150 (1961) ; Plesko v. City
of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 2d 210, 120 N.W. 2d 130 (1963).
1964-651
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
be admitted notwithstanding they are hearsay, for it is presumed that
a person will not falsify his statements to a physician who is attempting
to treat him. Professor Edmund M. Morgan, a leading authority on the
law of evidence, finalizes the above exception in the following manner:
A patient who consults a physician or surgeon for treatment has
every reason for answering truthfully all pertinent questions put
to him concerning his ... symptoms both subjective and objec-
tive. And generally speaking no medical attendant will treat or
prescribe for a patient without hearing and considering the his-
tory of his condition. For this reason. . . courts have wisely held
admissible, declarations as to ... bodily condition when made to
a medical attendant for the purpose of securing medical treat-
ment.
4
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court early recognized this ex-
ception to the hearsay rule, 5 it soon sought to limit its scope and prevent
possible abuse by holding in Kath that a physician could not testify as
to the subjective symptoms of a patient if, in addition to seeking medical
treatment, the patient intended that the doctor must also qualify himself
as a witness for possible future litigation. The Kath case further re-
stricted the exception by implying that if the doctor was consulted after
the attorney was retained, it would be inferred that the patient sought
the doctor for the dual purpose of treatment and testimony, and his
testimony could not be received into evidence.
While the Kath case has been upheld in several subsequent deci-
sions," there have been definite inroads made which lessen the impact
of the court's holding in the case.7 An example of this lessening oc-
curred in Rasmussen v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co." where the court held
that the mere fact that the plaintiff had retained a lawyer before he
consulted a doctor was not in and of itself proof enough to support an
inference that he was seeking objectives other than treatment. This
decision led the court in the principal case to hold that
the holding in Kath has been retained while at the same time
allowing a doctor to testify as to a patient's subjective symptoms
recited to the doctor during a consultation, which consultation, ac-
cording to the evidence in the record, by inference, may have been
arranged for the two-fold purpose of treatment plus examination
prior to testifying but concerning which the trial court has ruled
that the sole motivation of the claimant in arranging for the con-
sultation was treatment. We see no logic in continuing in adher-
ence to the Kath rule .... 9
4 2 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 287 (1954).
5 Keller v. Town of Gilman, 93 Wis. 9, 66 N.W. 800 (1904).6 Shield v. Fredrick, 232 Wis. 595, 288 N.W. 241 (1939); Thompson v. Nee,
supra note 3.
7La Fave v. Lemke, 3 Wis. 2d 502, 89 N.W. 2d 312 (1957) ; Plesko v. City of
Milwaukee, supra note 3.
8 264 Wis. 432, 59 N.W. 2d 457 (1952).
9 24 Wis. 2d at 164, 128 N.W. 2d at 442.
[Vol. 48
RECENT DECISIONS
The court in Ritter has now held that even though the plaintiff's aim
is two-fold, if the consultation is for the bona fide purpose of treat-
ment, the doctor's testimony is admissible. They are thus doing no
more than recognizing that it is almost impossible to segregate the two
motivations of treatment and testimony.
The majority of the other jurisdictions do not agree with this two-
fold purpose doctrine which was upheld in our supreme court. To un-
derstand this whole problem of admissibility of testimony as to sub-
jective symptoms, four categories have been utilized to illustrate how
the various jurisdictions differ in their holdings. A doctor's testimony
may be admissible (1) when patient relates present pain for treatment
purposes only; (2) when patient relates present and past pain for testi-
mony purposes only; (3) when patient relates past pain for treatment
purposes only; or (4) when patient relates present or past pain and a
two-fold purpose is admitted.
I. Patient relating present pain for treatment purposes only.
Statements by an injured person as to his present pains and symp-
toms during an examination by a physician for the purpose of treat-
ment only are almost universally held admissible.'0 In this instance the
doctor's testimony would be admissible as an exception to the hearsay
rule since it forms part of the res gestae, and since the statements are
made in the present, they are presumed free from all motives to mis-
represent because it would be absurd for a patient to relate falsities to
a physician who will need such information to treat the ailment and
make him well. Wisconsin is in. agreement with the majority rule.
I. Patient relating past or present symptoms and pain for testimony
purposes only.
Statements by a patient as to his present or past pains or symptoms
mtade to a physician examining him solely for the purpose of qualifying
the doctor as an expert witness are by the universal rule inadmissible."
The courts feel that since the patient has no desire for treatment, there
is no compelling reason for him to tell the truth to the physician as he
would have to if he wanted the doctor to make him well. These courts
also hold that the fact that a patient contemplated an action in court at
the time his statements were made to a physician does not in and of
'
0 McDuffie v. Root, 300 Mich. 286, 1 N.W. 2d 544 (1942); Cuneo Press Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 341 Ill. 469, 173 N.E. 470 (1930); Annot., 130 A.L.R.
977 (1941); Annot., 80 A.L.R. 1527 (1932); Annot., 67 A.L.R. 10 (1930).
, Kath v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry., supra note 2; Kienninger v. Interurban St. Ry.,
113 N.Y. Supp. 96 (Sup. Ct. 1908); Yellow Cab Co. v. Henderson, 183 Md.
546, 39 A. 2d 546 (1944) ; Stewart v. Everts, 76 Wis. 35, 44 N.W. 1092 (1890) ;
United States v. Neckle. 60 F. 2d 372 (8th Cir. 1932) ; Jensen v. Elgin, J. & E.
Ry, 15 Ili. 2d 559, 147 N.E. 2d 204 (1957) ; Stone v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0.
Ry., 88 Wis. 98, 59 N.W. 457 (1894).
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itself render his testimony inadmissible. Wisconsin follows the majority
rule here.
III. Patient relating past pain for treatment purposes only.
Statements by an injured person as to his past pains or symptoms
are usually considered purely hearsay by the majority of the courts and
deemed inadmissible.' 2 There is, however, some support for the view
that a statement concerning past pain and suffering made to a physician
during the course of the examination should be admissible to the same
extent as a statement of present pain and suffering. 13 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court held to this latter view in Keller v. Town of Gillman14
when it stated that "the statements and declarations of a patient as to
his pains and feelings, when made to a physician for the purpose of
treatment, may be given in evidence." 15 This minority rule was also
followed in the case of Brouwer v. Industrial Comn1'n :16
Mrs. Johnson testified that she became nauseated; she did not
testify that she had vomited. Dr. Duncan testified that when he
first examined her she told him [of vomiting]. The statement
was made by her for the purpose of treatment and was properly
received in evidence.
Leading authorities on the subject indicate that soon this will be the
majority holding.17 This author agrees with the authorities because if
we assume that man has a basic desire to help the doctor help him get
well, we must assume that he will tell the truth concerning the pain,
whether it be present or past.
IV. Patient relating present or past pain and has a two-fold purpose
of obtaining both treatment and expert testimony.
This is a very definite minority holding and is the holding of the
principal case. As was stated earlier, the principal case overturned Kath
which held the majority view' that there should not be this two-fold
purpose. The reasons were set forth in Kath as follows:
If he joins with that purpose [ie., treatment] an intention to call
the physician as an expert upon the trial of his case, whether
then pending or to be commenced, then there is distinctly present
the temptation to manufacture testimony when stating his symp-
toms and feelings to the physician. An easy way is thus opened
12 Reid v. Yellow Cab Co., 131 Ore. 27, 279 Pac. 635 (1896) ; Lowery v. Jones,
219 Ala. 201, 121 So. 514 (1929); Sund v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 164 Minn.
24, 204 N.W. 628 (1925).
13Meaney v. United States, 112 F. 2d 538 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Annot., 130 A.L.R.
975 (1941).
1493 Wis. 9, 66 N.W. 800.
is Id. at 11, 66 N.W. at 801.
16266 Wis. 73, 79, 62 N.W. 2d 577, 580 (1953).
'7 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 266 (1954); MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 4.
i8 Told v. Madison Bldg. Co., 216 Ill. App. 29 (1919) ; Annot., 67 A.L.R. 15
(1930).
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to put any quantity of self-serving ex parte statements before thejury, by simply employing an expert to give a few days' treatment
to the patient, and then putting the expert on the stand in this
dual capacity of expert and attending physician.19
The minority view is stated in the Ritter case and seems to be the main
reason why these courts so hold:
The rationale of the Kath rule regards statements made by the
patient to the physician as hearsay and in the nature of self-serv-
ing declarations. Kath allows testimony concerning such state-
ments where made to a physician while undergoing treatment, but
excludes the testimony where dual motivation is established. This
distinction is unrealistic. If the testimony on statements made in
one context is admissible then logically such testimony should
also be admissible where the statements are made in the other
context.
As long as a patient goes to a physician with the bona fide
purpose of receiving treatment, the basic desire of a patient to
get well, we believe, will generally motivate him to tell the truth
and this is sufficient reason to allow the attending physician to
testify about statements made to him which may touch on his
history and his subjective symptoms. Cross examination and ar-
gument are available to opposing counsel as a means of testing
such testimony.20
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in rendering this decision has done
nothing more than to recognize that which it has side-stepped up to
now. That is, to be able to tell the difference between when a man goes
to the doctor for treatment only and when he goes for the dual purpose
of treatment and testimony is for all practical purposes nearly im-
possible.
The court now must assume that the patient will not lie to a physi-
cian when his basic desire is to get well. This holding also means that
the court relies on two checks to defeat the admission of untruthful
statements: First, the belief that the physician will know if and when
the patient is lying about pain or sickness, from his vast store of medi-
cal knowledge; secondly, the system of cross-examination which will
glean out the inconsistencies in any testimony of a doubtful nature.21
TIMOTHY P. KENNY
Code Practice: Pain and Suffering: Per Injury Argument: In
Doolittle v. Western States Mut. Ins. Co.' the defendant's intestate
collided with a vehicle in which the plaintiff, Myra Doolittle, was a
19 121 Wis. at 512, 99 N.W. at 220.
20 24 Wis. 2d at 165, 128 N.W. 2d at 443.
21 Felkl v. Classified Risk Ins. Corp., 24 Wis. 2d 595, 129 N.W. 2d 222 (1964);
the supreme court affirmed its holdings in the Ritter case.24 Wis. 2d 135, 128 N.W. 2d 403 (1964).
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